Publications

Refine Results

(Filters Applied) Clear All

Modeling modern network attacks and countermeasures using attack graphs

Published in:
ACSAC 2009, Annual Computer Security Applications Conf., 7 December 2009, pp. 117-126.

Summary

By accurately measuring risk for enterprise networks, attack graphs allow network defenders to understand the most critical threats and select the most effective countermeasures. This paper describes substantial enhancements to the NetSPA attack graph system required to model additional present-day threats (zero-day exploits and client-side attacks) and countermeasures (intrusion prevention systems, proxy firewalls, personal firewalls, and host-based vulnerability scans). Point-to-point reachability algorithms and structures were extensively redesigned to support "reverse" reachability computations and personal firewalls. Host-based vulnerability scans are imported and analyzed. Analysis of an operational network with 85 hosts demonstrates that client-side attacks pose a serious threat. Experiments on larger simulated networks demonstrated that NetSPA's previous excellent scaling is maintained. Less than two minutes are required to completely analyze a four-enclave simulated network with more than 40,000 hosts protected by personal firewalls.
READ LESS

Summary

By accurately measuring risk for enterprise networks, attack graphs allow network defenders to understand the most critical threats and select the most effective countermeasures. This paper describes substantial enhancements to the NetSPA attack graph system required to model additional present-day threats (zero-day exploits and client-side attacks) and countermeasures (intrusion prevention...

READ MORE

An interactive attack graph cascade and reachability display

Published in:
VizSEC 2007, Proc. of the Workshop on Visualization for Computer Security, 29 October 2007, pp. 221-236.

Summary

Attack graphs for large enterprise networks improve security by revealing critical paths used by adversaries to capture network assets. Even with simplification, current attack graph displays are complex and difficult to relate to the underlying physical networks. We have developed a new interactive tool intended to provide a simplified and more intuitive understanding of key weaknesses discovered by attack graph analysis. Separate treemaps are used to display host groups in each subnet and hosts within each treemap are grouped based on reachability, attacker privilege level, and prerequisites. Users position subnets themselves to reflect their own intuitive grasp of network topology. Users can also single-step the attack graph to successively add edges that cascade to show how attackers progress through a network and learn what vulnerabilities or trust relationships allow critical steps. Finally, an integrated reachability display demonstrates how filtering devices affect host-to-host network reachability and influence attacker actions. This display scales to networks with thousands of hosts and many subnets. Rapid interactivity has been achieved because of an efficient C++ computation engine (a program named NetSPA) that performs attack graph and reachability computations, while a Java application manages the display and user interface.
READ LESS

Summary

Attack graphs for large enterprise networks improve security by revealing critical paths used by adversaries to capture network assets. Even with simplification, current attack graph displays are complex and difficult to relate to the underlying physical networks. We have developed a new interactive tool intended to provide a simplified and...

READ MORE

Tuning intrusion detection to work with a two encryption key version of IPsec

Published in:
IEEE MILCOM 2007, 29-31 October 2007, pp. 3977-3983.

Summary

Network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) are one component of a comprehensive network security solution. The use of IPsec, which encrypts network traffic, renders network intrusion detection virtually useless unless traffic is decrypted at network gateways. Host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDSs) can provide some of the functionality of NIDSs but with limitations. HIDSs cannot perform a network-wide analysis and can be subverted if a host is compromised. We propose an approach to intrusion detection that combines HIDS, NIDS, and a version of IPsec that encrypts the header and the body of IP packets separately ("Two-Zone IPsec"). We show that all of the network events currently detectable by the Snort NIDS on unencrypted network traffic are also detectable on encrypted network traffic using this approach. The NIDS detects network-level events that HIDSs have trouble detecting and HIDSs detect application-level events that can't be detected by the NIDS.
READ LESS

Summary

Network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) are one component of a comprehensive network security solution. The use of IPsec, which encrypts network traffic, renders network intrusion detection virtually useless unless traffic is decrypted at network gateways. Host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDSs) can provide some of the functionality of NIDSs but with...

READ MORE

Making network intrusion detection work with IPsec

Published in:
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report TR-1121

Summary

Network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) are one component of a comprehensive network security solution. The use of IPsec, which encrypts network traffic, renders network intrusion detection virtually useless unless traffic is decrypted at network gateways. One alternative to NIDSs, host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDSs), provides some of the functionality of NIDSs but with limitations. HIDSs cannot perform a network-wide analysis and can be subverted if a host is compromised. We propose an approach to intrusion detection that combines HIDS, NIDS, and a version of IPsec that encrypts the header and the body of IP packets separately. We refer to the latter generically as Two-Key IPsec. We show that all of the network events currently detectable by the Snort NIDS on unencrypted network traffic are also detectable on encrypted network traffic using this approach. The NIDS detects network-level events that HIDSs have trouble detecting and HIDSs detect application-level events that can't be detected by the NIDS.
READ LESS

Summary

Network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) are one component of a comprehensive network security solution. The use of IPsec, which encrypts network traffic, renders network intrusion detection virtually useless unless traffic is decrypted at network gateways. One alternative to NIDSs, host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDSs), provides some of the functionality of...

READ MORE

Coverage maximization using dynamic taint tracing

Published in:
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report TR-1112

Summary

We present COMET, a system that automatically assembles a test suite for a C program to improve line coverage, and give initial results for a prototype implementation. COMET works dynamically, running the program under a variety of instrumentations in a feedback loop that adds new inputs to an initial corpus with each iteration. One instrumentation in particular is crucial to the success of this approach: dynamic taint tracing. Inputs are labeled as tainted at the byte level and all read/write pairs in the program are augmented to track the flow of taint between memory objects. This allows COMET to determine from which bytes of which inputs the variables in conditions derive, thereby dramatically narrowing the search over inputs necessary to expose new code. On a test set of 13 example program, COMET improves upon the level of coverage reached in random testing by an average of 23% relative, takes only about twice the time, and requires a tiny fraction of the number of inputs to do so.
READ LESS

Summary

We present COMET, a system that automatically assembles a test suite for a C program to improve line coverage, and give initial results for a prototype implementation. COMET works dynamically, running the program under a variety of instrumentations in a feedback loop that adds new inputs to an initial corpus...

READ MORE

Practical attack graph generation for network defense

Published in:
Proc. of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conf., IEEE, 11-15 December 2006, pp.121-130.

Summary

Attack graphs are a valuable tool to network defenders, illustrating paths an attacker can use to gain access to a targeted network. Defenders can then focus their efforts on patching the vulnerabilities and configuration errors that allow the attackers the greatest amount of access. We have created a new type of attack graph, the multiple-prerequisite graph, that scales nearly linearly as the size of a typical network increases. We have built a prototype system using this graph type. The prototype uses readily available source data to automatically compute network reachability, classify vulnerabilities, build the graph, and recommend actions to improve network security. We have tested the prototype on an operational network with over 250 hosts, where it helped to discover a previously unknown configuration error. It has processed complex simulated networks with over 50,000 hosts in under four minutes.
READ LESS

Summary

Attack graphs are a valuable tool to network defenders, illustrating paths an attacker can use to gain access to a targeted network. Defenders can then focus their efforts on patching the vulnerabilities and configuration errors that allow the attackers the greatest amount of access. We have created a new type...

READ MORE

Validating and restoring defense in depth using attack graphs

Summary

Defense in depth is a common strategy that uses layers of firewalls to protect Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) subnets and other critical resources on enterprise networks. A tool named NetSPA is presented that analyzes firewall rules and vulnerabilities to construct attack graphs. These show how inside and outside attackers can progress by successively compromising exposed vulnerable hosts with the goal of reaching critical internal targets. NetSPA generates attack graphs and automatically analyzes them to produce a small set of prioritized recommendations to restore defense in depth. Field trials on networks with up to 3,400 hosts demonstrate that firewalls often do not provide defense in depth due to misconfigurations and critical unpatched vulnerabilities on hosts. In all cases, a small number of recommendations was provided to restore defense in depth. Simulations on networks with up to 50,000 hosts demonstrate that this approach scales well to enterprise-size networks.
READ LESS

Summary

Defense in depth is a common strategy that uses layers of firewalls to protect Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) subnets and other critical resources on enterprise networks. A tool named NetSPA is presented that analyzes firewall rules and vulnerabilities to construct attack graphs. These show how inside and outside...

READ MORE

Experience using active and passive mapping for network situational awareness

Published in:
5th IEEE Int. Symp. on Network Computing and Applications NCA06, 24-26 July 2006, pp. 19-26.

Summary

Passive network mapping has often been proposed as an approach to maintain up-to-date information on networks between active scans. This paper presents a comparison of active and passive mapping on an operational network. On this network, active and passive tools found largely disjoint sets of services and the passive system took weeks to discover the last 15% of active services. Active and passive mapping tools provided different, not complimentary information. Deploying passive mapping on an enterprise network does not reduce the need for timely active scans due to non-overlapping coverage and potentially long discovery times.
READ LESS

Summary

Passive network mapping has often been proposed as an approach to maintain up-to-date information on networks between active scans. This paper presents a comparison of active and passive mapping on an operational network. On this network, active and passive tools found largely disjoint sets of services and the passive system...

READ MORE

A taxonomy of buffer overflows for evaluating static and dynamic software testing tools

Published in:
NIST Workshop on Software Security, Assurance Tools, Techniques, and Metrics, 7-8 November 2005.

Summary

A taxonomy that uses twenty-two attributes to characterize C-program overflows was used to construct 291 small C-program test cases that can be used to diagnostically determine the basic capabilities of static and dynamic analysis buffer overflow detection tools. Attributes in the taxonomy include the buffer location (e.g. stack, heap, data region, BSS, shared memory); scope difference between buffer allocation and access; index, pointer, and alias complexity when addressing buffer elements; complexity of the control flow and loop structure surrounding the overflow; type of container the buffer is within (e.g. structure, union, array); whether the overflow is caused by a signed/unsigned type error; the overflow magnitude and direction; and whether the overflow is discrete or continuous. As an example, the 291 test cases were used to measure the detection, false alarm, and confusion rates of five static analysis tools. They reveal specific strengths and limitations of tools and suggest directions for improvements.
READ LESS

Summary

A taxonomy that uses twenty-two attributes to characterize C-program overflows was used to construct 291 small C-program test cases that can be used to diagnostically determine the basic capabilities of static and dynamic analysis buffer overflow detection tools. Attributes in the taxonomy include the buffer location (e.g. stack, heap, data...

READ MORE

Evaluating and strengthening enterprise network security using attack graphs

Summary

Assessing the security of large enterprise networks is complex and labor intensive. Current security analysis tools typically examine only individual firewalls, routers, or hosts separately and do not comprehensively analyze overall network security. We present a new approach that uses configuration information on firewalls and vulnerability information on all network devices to build attack graphs that show how far inside and outside attackers can progress through a network by successively compromising exposed and vulnerable hosts. In addition, attack graphs are automatically analyzed to produce a small set of prioritized recommendations to enhance network security. Field trials on networks with up to 3,400 hosts demonstrate the ability to accurately identify a small number of critical stepping-stone hosts that need to be patched to protect against external attackers. Simulation studies on complex networks with more than 40,000 hosts demonstrate good scaling. This analysis can be used for many purposes, including identifying critical stepping-stone hosts to patch or protect with a firewall, comparing the security of alternating network designs, determining the security risk caused by proposed changes in firewall rules or new vulnerabilities, and identifying the most critical hosts to patch when a new vulnerability is announced. Unique aspects of this work are new attack graph generation algorithms that scale to enterprise networks with thousands of hosts, efficient approaches to determine what other hosts and ports in large networks are reachable from each individual host, automatic data importation from network vulnerability scanners and firewalls, and automatic attack graph analyses to generate recommendations.
READ LESS

Summary

Assessing the security of large enterprise networks is complex and labor intensive. Current security analysis tools typically examine only individual firewalls, routers, or hosts separately and do not comprehensively analyze overall network security. We present a new approach that uses configuration information on firewalls and vulnerability information on all network...

READ MORE