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A compact end cryptographic unit for tactical unmanned systems

July 11, 2019
  |
Conference Paper
Author:
Hoa G. Nguyen
…
Published in:
Proc. SPIE 11021, Unmanned Systems Technology XXI, 11 July 2019, 1102101.
Topic:
cyber security
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

Under the Navy's Flexible Cyber-Secure Radio (FlexCSR) program, the Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory are jointly developing a unique cybersecurity solution for tactical unmanned systems (UxS): the FlexCSR Security/Cyber Module (SCM) End Cryptographic Unit (ECU). To deal with possible loss of unmanned systems that contain the device, the SCM ECU uses only publicly available Commercial National Security Algorithms and a Tactical Key Management system to generate and distribute onboard mission keys that are destroyed at mission completion or upon compromise. This also significantly reduces the logistic complexity traditionally involved with protection and loading of classified cryptographic keys. The SCM ECU is on track to be certified by the National Security Agency for protecting tactical data-in-transit up to Secret level. The FlexCSR SCM ECU is the first stand-alone cryptographic module that conforms to the United States Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Communications Architecture for Unmanned Systems, an initiative by the Office of the Secretary of Defense supporting the interoperability pillar of the DoD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap. It is a credit card-sized enclosed unit that provides USB interfaces for plaintext and ciphertext, support for radio controls and management, and a software Application Programming Interface that together allow easy integration into tactical UxS communication systems. This paper gives an overview of the architecture, interfaces, usage, and development and approval schedule of the device.
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Summary

Under the Navy's Flexible Cyber-Secure Radio (FlexCSR) program, the Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory are jointly developing a unique cybersecurity solution for tactical unmanned systems (UxS): the FlexCSR Security/Cyber Module (SCM) End Cryptographic Unit (ECU). To deal with possible loss of unmanned...

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A compact end cryptographic unit for tactical unmanned systems

Supporting security sensitive tenants in a bare-metal cloud

July 10, 2019
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Conference Paper
Author:
Amin Mosayyebzadeh
…
Published in:
2019 USENIX Annual Technical Conf., 10-12 July 2019.
Topic:
cyber security
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

Bolted is a new architecture for bare-metal clouds that enables tenants to control tradeoffs between security, price, and performance. Security-sensitive tenants can minimize their trust in the public cloud provider and achieve similar levels of security and control that they can obtain in their own private data centers. At the same time, Bolted neither imposes overhead on tenants that are security insensitive nor compromises the flexibility or operational efficiency of the provider. Our prototype exploits a novel provisioning system and specialized firmware to enable elasticity similar to virtualized clouds. Experimentally we quantify the cost of different levels of security for a variety of workloads and demonstrate the value of giving control to the tenant.
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Summary

Bolted is a new architecture for bare-metal clouds that enables tenants to control tradeoffs between security, price, and performance. Security-sensitive tenants can minimize their trust in the public cloud provider and achieve similar levels of security and control that they can obtain in their own private data centers. At the...

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Supporting security sensitive tenants in a bare-metal cloud

Control-flow integrity for real-time embedded systems

July 9, 2019
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Conference Paper
Author:
Robert J. Walls
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Published in:
31st Euromicro Conf. on Real-Time Systems, ECRTS, 9-12 July 2019.
Topic:
embedded computing
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

Attacks on real-time embedded systems can endanger lives and critical infrastructure. Despite this, techniques for securing embedded systems software have not been widely studied. Many existing security techniques for general-purpose computers rely on assumptions that do not hold in the embedded case. This paper focuses on one such technique, control-flow integrity (CFI), that has been vetted as an effective countermeasure against control-flow hijacking attacks on general-purpose computing systems. Without the process isolation and fine-grained memory protections provided by a general-purpose computer with a rich operating system, CFI cannot provide any security guarantees. This work proposes RECFISH, a system for providing CFI guarantees on ARM Cortex-R devices running minimal real-time operating systems. We provide techniques for protecting runtime structures, isolating processes, and instrumenting compiled ARM binaries with CFI protection. We empirically evaluate RECFISH and its performance implications for real-time systems. Our results suggest RECFISH can be directly applied to binaries without compromising real-time performance; in a test of over six million realistic task systems running FreeRTOS, 85% were still schedulable after adding RECFISH.
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Summary

Attacks on real-time embedded systems can endanger lives and critical infrastructure. Despite this, techniques for securing embedded systems software have not been widely studied. Many existing security techniques for general-purpose computers rely on assumptions that do not hold in the embedded case. This paper focuses on one such technique, control-flow...

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Control-flow integrity for real-time embedded systems

Discriminative PLDA for speaker verification with X-vectors

May 12, 2019
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Conference Paper
Author:
Bengt J. Borgstrom
Published in:
International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, May 2019 [submitted]
Topic:
speaker recognition
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

This paper proposes a novel approach to discriminative training ofprobabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) for speaker veri-fication with x-vectors. The Newton Method is used to discrimi-natively train the PLDA model by minimizing the log loss of ver-ification trials. By diagonalizing the across-class and within-classcovariance matrices as a pre-processing step, the PLDA model canbe trained without relying on approximations, and while maintain-ing important properties of the underlying covariance matrices. Thetraining procedure is extended to allow for efficient domain adapta-tion. When applied to the Speakers in the Wild and SRE16 tasks, theproposed approach provides significant performance improvementsrelative to conventional PLDA.
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Summary

This paper proposes a novel approach to discriminative training ofprobabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) for speaker veri-fication with x-vectors. The Newton Method is used to discrimi-natively train the PLDA model by minimizing the log loss of ver-ification trials. By diagonalizing the across-class and within-classcovariance matrices as a pre-processing step, the...

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Discriminative PLDA for speaker verification with X-vectors

AI enabling technologies: a survey

May 8, 2019
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Journal Article
Author:
Vijay N. Gadepally
…
Published in:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.03592
Topic:
artificial intelligence
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the opportunity to revolutionize the way the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) address the challenges of evolving threats, data deluge, and rapid courses of action. Developing an end-to-end artificial intelligence system involves parallel development of different pieces that must work together in order to provide capabilities that can be used by decision makers, warfighters and analysts. These pieces include data collection, data conditioning, algorithms, computing, robust artificial intelligence, and human-machine teaming. While much of the popular press today surrounds advances in algorithms and computing, most modern AI systems leverage advances across numerous different fields. Further, while certain components may not be as visible to end-users as others, our experience has shown that each of these interrelated components play a major role in the success or failure of an AI system. This article is meant to highlight many of these technologies that are involved in an end-to-end AI system. The goal of this article is to provide readers with an overview of terminology, technical details and recent highlights from academia, industry and government. Where possible, we indicate relevant resources that can be used for further reading and understanding.
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Summary

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the opportunity to revolutionize the way the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) address the challenges of evolving threats, data deluge, and rapid courses of action. Developing an end-to-end artificial intelligence system involves parallel development of different pieces that must work together...

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AI enabling technologies: a survey

Security considerations for next-generation operating systems for cyber-physical systems

April 15, 2019
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Conference Paper
Author:
Bryan Ward
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Published in:
1st Intl. Workshop on Next-Generation Operating Systems for Cyber-Physical Systems, NGOSCPS, 15 April 2019.
Topic:
cyber security
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly targeted in high-profile cyber attacks. Examples of such attacks include Stuxnet, which targeted nuclear centrifuges; Crashoverride, and Triton, which targeted power grids; and the Mirai botnet, which targeted internet-of-things (IoT) devices such as cameras to carry out a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. Such attacks demonstrate the importance of securing current and future cyber-physical systems. Therefore, next-generation operating systems (OSes) for CPS need to be designed to provide security features necessary, as well as be secure in and of themselves. CPSs are designed with one of three broad classes of OSes: (a) bare-metal applications with effectively no operating system, (b) embedded systems executing on impoverished platforms running an embedded or real-time operating system (RTOS) such as FreeRTOS, or (c) more performant platforms running general purpose OSes such as Linux, sometimes tuned for real-time performance such as through the PREEMPT_RT patch. In cases (a) and (b), the OS, if any, is very minimal to facilitate improved resource utilization in real-time or latency-sensitive applications, especially running on impoverished hardware platforms. In such OSes, security is often overlooked, and many important security features (e.g. process/kernel memory isolation) are notably absent. In case (c), the general-purpose OS inherits many of the security-related features that are critical in enterprise and general-purpose applications, such as virtual memory and address-space layout randomization (ASLR). However, the highly complex nature of general-purpose OSes can be problematic in the development of CPSs, as they are highly non-deterministic and difficult to formally reason about for cyber-physical applications, which often have real-time constraints. These issues motivate the need for a next generation OS that is highly capable, predictable and deterministic for real-time performance, but also secure in the face of many of the next generation of cyber threats. In order to design such a next-generation OS, it is necessary to first reflect on the types of threats that CPSs face, including the attacker intentions and types of effects that can be achieved, as well as the type of access that attackers have. While threat models are not the same for all CPSs, it is important to understand how the threat models for CPSs compare to general-purpose or enterprise computing environments. We discuss these issues next (Sec. 2), before providing insights and recommendations for approaches to incorporate in next-generation OSes for CPS in Sec. 3.
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Summary

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly targeted in high-profile cyber attacks. Examples of such attacks include Stuxnet, which targeted nuclear centrifuges; Crashoverride, and Triton, which targeted power grids; and the Mirai botnet, which targeted internet-of-things (IoT) devices such as cameras to carry out a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. Such attacks...

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Security considerations for next-generation operating systems for cyber-physical systems

Design and analysis framework for trusted and assured microelectronics

March 25, 2019
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Conference Paper
Author:
Aaron J. Mills
…
Published in:
GOMACTech 2019, 25-28 March 2019.
Topic:
microelectronics
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

An in-depth understanding of microelectronics assurance in Department of Defense (DoD) missions is increasingly important as the DoD continues to address supply chain challenges. Many studies take a "bottom-up" approach, in which vulnerabilities are assessed in terms of general-purpose usage. This is beneficial in developing a general knowledge foundation. However, it does not offer much insight for program managers, technical leads, etc. to determine, for a specific mission and operating environment, the risks and requirements to using a microelectronic device. It is critical to develop a systematic approach that considers mission objectives, as the same component could be used in a weapon system or a surveillance system with significantly different requirements. We have been developing a Trusted and Assured Microelectronics (T&AM) Framework, which considers the entire system life cycle to produce mission-specific metrics and assessments. A radar system exemplar illustrates the approach and how the metric can be used as a Figure of Merit for quantitative analysis during development.
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Summary

An in-depth understanding of microelectronics assurance in Department of Defense (DoD) missions is increasingly important as the DoD continues to address supply chain challenges. Many studies take a "bottom-up" approach, in which vulnerabilities are assessed in terms of general-purpose usage. This is beneficial in developing a general knowledge foundation. However...

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Design and analysis framework for trusted and assured microelectronics

HARDEN: A high assurance design environment

March 25, 2019
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Conference Paper
Author:
Haley R. Whitman
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Published in:
GOMACTech 2019, 25-28 March 2019.
Topic:
resilient systems
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

Systems resilient to cyber-attacks for mission assurance are difficult to develop, and the means of effectively evaluating them is even harder. We have developed a new architectural design and engineering environment, referred to as HARDEN (High AssuRance Design ENvironment), which supports an agile design methodology used to create secure and resilient systems. This new toolkit facilitates the quantitative analysis of a system's security posture by setting up a systematic approach of securing and analyzing embedded systems. HARDEN promotes the early co-design of functionality and security that now enables the development of mission assured systems.
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Summary

Systems resilient to cyber-attacks for mission assurance are difficult to develop, and the means of effectively evaluating them is even harder. We have developed a new architectural design and engineering environment, referred to as HARDEN (High AssuRance Design ENvironment), which supports an agile design methodology used to create secure and...

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HARDEN: A high assurance design environment

Understanding Mission-Driven Resiliency Workshop

March 18, 2019
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Conference Paper
Author:
Jeremy L. Mineweaser
…
Published in:
Lincoln Laboratory
Topic:
resilient systems
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

MIT Lincoln Laboratory hosted an invitation-only, one-day interdisciplinary workshop entitled
“Understanding Mission-Driven Resiliency” on behalf of the US Air Force, on March 18, 2019 at MIT
Lincoln Laboratory Beaver Works in Cambridge, MA. Participants began to bridge the gap between
government and industry to improve the resiliency of government systems to cyber attacks. The
workshop focused on understanding and defining resiliency from different perspectives and included
five panels devoted to discussing how different industries view and manage resiliency within their
organizations, the sources of resiliency within organizations and software-intensive systems, measuring
resiliency, and building resiliency within an organization or technology stack.
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Summary

MIT Lincoln Laboratory hosted an invitation-only, one-day interdisciplinary workshop entitled
“Understanding Mission-Driven Resiliency” on behalf of the US Air Force, on March 18, 2019 at MIT
Lincoln Laboratory Beaver Works in Cambridge, MA. Participants began to bridge the gap between
government and industry to improve the resiliency of government systems...

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Understanding Mission-Driven Resiliency Workshop

FastDAWG: improving data migration in the BigDAWG polystore system

February 21, 2019
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Conference Paper
Author:
Xiangyao Yu
…
Published in:
Poly 2018/DMAH 2018, LNCS 11470, 2019, pp. 3–15.
Topic:
supercomputing
R&D area:
R&D group:

Summary

The problem of data integration has been around for decades, yet a satisfactory solution has not yet emerged. A new type of system called a polystore has surfaced to partially address the integration problem. Based on experience with our own polystore called Big-DAWG, we identify three major roadblocks to an acceptable commercial solution. We offer a new architecture inspired by these three problems that trades some generality for usability. This architecture also exploits modern hardware (i.e., high-speed networks and RDMA) to gain performance. The paper concludes with some promising experimental results.
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Summary

The problem of data integration has been around for decades, yet a satisfactory solution has not yet emerged. A new type of system called a polystore has surfaced to partially address the integration problem. Based on experience with our own polystore called Big-DAWG, we identify three major roadblocks to an...

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FastDAWG: improving data migration in the BigDAWG polystore system
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