Publications

This tutorial explains a systematic approach of co-designing functionality and security into mission-criticalembedded systems. The tutorial starts by reviewing common issues in embedded applications to define mission objectives,threat models, and security/resilience goals. We then introduce an overview of security technologies toachieve goals of confidentiality, integrity, and availability given design criteria and a realistic threatmodel. The technologies range from practical cryptography and key management, protection of data atrest, data in transit, and data in use, and tamper resistance.A major portion of the tutorial is dedicated to exploring the mission critical embedded system solutionspace. We discuss the search for security vulnerabilities (red teaming) and the search for solutions (blueteaming). Besides the lecture, attendees, under instructor guidance, will perform realistic andmeaningful hands-on exercises of defining mission and security objectives, assessing principal issues,applying technologies, and understanding their interactions. The instructor will provide an exampleapplication (distributed sensing, communicating, and computing) to be used in these exercises.Attendees could also bring their own applications for the exercises.Attendees are encouraged to work collaboratively throughout the development process, thus creatingopportunities to learn from each other. During the exercise, attendees will consider the use of varioussecurity/resilience features, articulate and justify the use of resources, and assess the system’ssuitability for mission assurance. Attendees can expect to gain valuable insight and experience in thesubject after completing the lecture and exercises.The instructor, who is an expert and practitioner in the field, will offer insight, advice, and concreteexamples and discussions. The tutorial draws from the instructor’s decades of experience in secure,resilient systems and technology.

Systems resilient to cyber-attacks for mission assurance are difficult to develop, and the means of effectively evaluating them is even harder. We have developed a new architectural design and engineering environment, referred to as HARDEN (High AssuRance Design ENvironment), which supports an agile design methodology used to create secure and resilient systems. This new toolkit facilitates the quantitative analysis of a system's security posture by setting up a systematic approach of securing and analyzing embedded systems. HARDEN promotes the early co-design of functionality and security that now enables the development of mission assured systems.

MIT Lincoln Laboratory hosted an invitation-only, one-day interdisciplinary workshop entitled
“Understanding Mission-Driven Resiliency” on behalf of the US Air Force, on March 18, 2019 at MIT
Lincoln Laboratory Beaver Works in Cambridge, MA. Participants began to bridge the gap between
government and industry to improve the resiliency of government systems to cyber attacks. The
workshop focused on understanding and defining resiliency from different perspectives and included
five panels devoted to discussing how different industries view and manage resiliency within their
organizations, the sources of resiliency within organizations and software-intensive systems, measuring
resiliency, and building resiliency within an organization or technology stack.

Data provenance is a valuable tool for protecting and troubleshooting distributed systems. Careful design of the provenance components reduces the impact on the design, implementation, and operation of the distributed system. In this paper, we present Curator, a provenance management toolkit that can be easily integrated with microservice-based systems and other modern distributed systems. This paper describes the design of Curator and discusses how we have used Curator to add provenance to distributed systems. We find that our approach results in no changes to the design of these distributed systems and minimal additional code and dependencies to manage. In addition, Curator uses the same scalable infrastructure as the distributed system and can therefore scale with the distributed system.