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The leakage-resilience dilemma

Published in:
Proc. European Symp. on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2019, pp. 87-106.

Summary

Many control-flow-hijacking attacks rely on information leakage to disclose the location of gadgets. To address this, several leakage-resilient defenses, have been proposed that fundamentally limit the power of information leakage. Examples of such defenses include address-space re-randomization, destructive code reads, and execute-only code memory. Underlying all of these defenses is some form of code randomization. In this paper, we illustrate that randomization at the granularity of a page or coarser is not secure, and can be exploited by generalizing the idea of partial pointer overwrites, which we call the Relative ROP (RelROP) attack. We then analyzed more that 1,300 common binaries and found that 94% of them contained sufficient gadgets for an attacker to spawn a shell. To demonstrate this concretely, we built a proof-of-concept exploit against PHP 7.0.0. Furthermore, randomization at a granularity finer than a memory page faces practicality challenges when applied to shared libraries. Our findings highlight the dilemma that faces randomization techniques: course-grained techniques are efficient but insecure and fine-grained techniques are secure but impractical.
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Summary

Many control-flow-hijacking attacks rely on information leakage to disclose the location of gadgets. To address this, several leakage-resilient defenses, have been proposed that fundamentally limit the power of information leakage. Examples of such defenses include address-space re-randomization, destructive code reads, and execute-only code memory. Underlying all of these defenses is...

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Control-flow integrity for real-time embedded systems

Published in:
31st Euromicro Conf. on Real-Time Systems, ECRTS, 9-12 July 2019.

Summary

Attacks on real-time embedded systems can endanger lives and critical infrastructure. Despite this, techniques for securing embedded systems software have not been widely studied. Many existing security techniques for general-purpose computers rely on assumptions that do not hold in the embedded case. This paper focuses on one such technique, control-flow integrity (CFI), that has been vetted as an effective countermeasure against control-flow hijacking attacks on general-purpose computing systems. Without the process isolation and fine-grained memory protections provided by a general-purpose computer with a rich operating system, CFI cannot provide any security guarantees. This work proposes RECFISH, a system for providing CFI guarantees on ARM Cortex-R devices running minimal real-time operating systems. We provide techniques for protecting runtime structures, isolating processes, and instrumenting compiled ARM binaries with CFI protection. We empirically evaluate RECFISH and its performance implications for real-time systems. Our results suggest RECFISH can be directly applied to binaries without compromising real-time performance; in a test of over six million realistic task systems running FreeRTOS, 85% were still schedulable after adding RECFISH.
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Summary

Attacks on real-time embedded systems can endanger lives and critical infrastructure. Despite this, techniques for securing embedded systems software have not been widely studied. Many existing security techniques for general-purpose computers rely on assumptions that do not hold in the embedded case. This paper focuses on one such technique, control-flow...

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Security considerations for next-generation operating systems for cyber-physical systems

Published in:
1st Intl. Workshop on Next-Generation Operating Systems for Cyber-Physical Systems, NGOSCPS, 15 April 2019.

Summary

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly targeted in high-profile cyber attacks. Examples of such attacks include Stuxnet, which targeted nuclear centrifuges; Crashoverride, and Triton, which targeted power grids; and the Mirai botnet, which targeted internet-of-things (IoT) devices such as cameras to carry out a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. Such attacks demonstrate the importance of securing current and future cyber-physical systems. Therefore, next-generation operating systems (OSes) for CPS need to be designed to provide security features necessary, as well as be secure in and of themselves. CPSs are designed with one of three broad classes of OSes: (a) bare-metal applications with effectively no operating system, (b) embedded systems executing on impoverished platforms running an embedded or real-time operating system (RTOS) such as FreeRTOS, or (c) more performant platforms running general purpose OSes such as Linux, sometimes tuned for real-time performance such as through the PREEMPT_RT patch. In cases (a) and (b), the OS, if any, is very minimal to facilitate improved resource utilization in real-time or latency-sensitive applications, especially running on impoverished hardware platforms. In such OSes, security is often overlooked, and many important security features (e.g. process/kernel memory isolation) are notably absent. In case (c), the general-purpose OS inherits many of the security-related features that are critical in enterprise and general-purpose applications, such as virtual memory and address-space layout randomization (ASLR). However, the highly complex nature of general-purpose OSes can be problematic in the development of CPSs, as they are highly non-deterministic and difficult to formally reason about for cyber-physical applications, which often have real-time constraints. These issues motivate the need for a next generation OS that is highly capable, predictable and deterministic for real-time performance, but also secure in the face of many of the next generation of cyber threats. In order to design such a next-generation OS, it is necessary to first reflect on the types of threats that CPSs face, including the attacker intentions and types of effects that can be achieved, as well as the type of access that attackers have. While threat models are not the same for all CPSs, it is important to understand how the threat models for CPSs compare to general-purpose or enterprise computing environments. We discuss these issues next (Sec. 2), before providing insights and recommendations for approaches to incorporate in next-generation OSes for CPS in Sec. 3.
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Summary

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly targeted in high-profile cyber attacks. Examples of such attacks include Stuxnet, which targeted nuclear centrifuges; Crashoverride, and Triton, which targeted power grids; and the Mirai botnet, which targeted internet-of-things (IoT) devices such as cameras to carry out a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. Such attacks...

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