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Measurements of the 1030 and 1090 MHz environments at JFK International Airport

Published in:
Project Report ATC-390, MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Summary

Measurements of signals in the 1030 and 1090 MHz frequency bands have been made by MIT Lincoln Laboratory in the last several years, previously in the Boston area and most recently in April 2011, at JFK International Airport near New York City. This JFK measurement activity was performed as a part of the Lincoln Laboratory Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) work for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and is the subject of this report. This report includes: 1) Overall characteristics of the 1030/1090 MHz environments, 2) Analysis of the TCAS air-to-air coordination process, 3) Examination of 1090 MHz Extended Squitter transmissions for use in TCAS, 4) Assessment of the extent and impact of TCAS operation on the airport surface.
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Summary

Measurements of signals in the 1030 and 1090 MHz frequency bands have been made by MIT Lincoln Laboratory in the last several years, previously in the Boston area and most recently in April 2011, at JFK International Airport near New York City. This JFK measurement activity was performed as a...

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Measurements of the 1030 and 1090 MHz environments at JFK International Airport

Summary

Measurements of signals in the 1030 and 1090 MHz frequency bands have been made by MIT Lincoln Laboratory in the last several years, previously in the Boston area and most recently in April 2011, at JFK International Airport near New York City. This JFK measurement activity was performed as a part of the Lincoln Laboratory Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) work for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and is the subject of this report. This report includes: 1) Overall characteristics of the 1030/1090 MHz environments, 2) Analysis of the TCAS air-to-air coordination process, 3) Examination of 1090 MHz Extended Squitter transmissions for use in TCAS, 4) Assessment of the extent and impact of TCAS operation on the airport surface.
READ LESS

Summary

Measurements of signals in the 1030 and 1090 MHz frequency bands have been made by MIT Lincoln Laboratory in the last several years, previously in the Boston area and most recently in April 2011, at JFK International Airport near New York City. This JFK measurement activity was performed as a...

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Lincoln Laboratory 1030/1090 MHz monitoring, March-June 2010

Published in:
Project Report ATC-372, MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Summary

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) behavior in New England airspace is being monitored and analyzed, making use of an omni-directional 1030/1090 MHz receiver. The receiver system, located in Lexington, Massachusetts, and operated by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, is used to record data for subsequent analysis in non-real-time. This is the second report of MIT Lincoln Laboratory 1030/1090 MHz monitoring, covering the period March through June 2010. There are three main areas of study: 1. 1030 MHz data related to TCAS air-to-air coordination and other communications, 2. 1030 and 1090 MHz data related to TCAS surveillance, and 3. 1090 MHZ Extended Squitter data, i.e., the Mode S implementation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). In addition to a summary of results, this report answers specific questions raised during the previous 2009 analysis and attempts to provide insights into the meaning of the data with respect to TCAS operation. This four-month period will be used to baseline 1030/1090 MHz activity in the New England area. Future plans call for the 1030/1090 MHz receiver to be moved so that limited data recording can be performed at various TCAS RA monitoring system (TRAMS) sites throughout the NAS.
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Summary

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) behavior in New England airspace is being monitored and analyzed, making use of an omni-directional 1030/1090 MHz receiver. The receiver system, located in Lexington, Massachusetts, and operated by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, is used to record data for subsequent analysis in non-real-time. This is...

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Lincoln Laboratory 1030/1090 MHz monitoring, March-June 2010

Published in:
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report ATC-372

Summary

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) behavior in New England airspace is being monitored and analyzed, making use of an omni-directional 1030/1090 MHz receiver. The receiver system, located in Lexington, Massachusetts, and operated by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, is used to record data for subsequent analysis in non-real-time. This is the second report of MIT Lincoln Laboratory 1030/1090 MHz monitoring, covering the period March through June 2010. There are three main areas of study: 1. 1030 MHz data related to TCAS air-to-air coordination and other communications, 2. 1030 and 1090 MHz data related to TCAS surveillance, and 3. 1090 MHZ Extended Squitter data, i.e., the Mode S implementation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). In addition to a summary of results, this report answers specific questions raised during the previous 2009 analysis and attempts to provide insights into the meaning of the data with respect to TCAS operation. This four-month period will be used to baseline 1030/1090 MHz activity in the New England area. Future plans call for the 1030/1090 MHz receiver to be moved so that limited data recording can be performed at various TCAS RA monitoring system (TRAMS) sites throughout the NAS.
READ LESS

Summary

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) behavior in New England airspace is being monitored and analyzed, making use of an omni-directional 1030/1090 MHz receiver. The receiver system, located in Lexington, Massachusetts, and operated by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, is used to record data for subsequent analysis in non-real-time. This is...

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The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System

Author:
Published in:
Lincoln Laboratory Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2007, pp. 277-296.

Summary

The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) has had extraordinary success in reducing the risk of mid-air collisions. Now mandated on all large transport aircraft, TCAS has been in operation for more than a decade and has prevented several catastrophic accidents. TCAS is a unique decision support system in the sense that it has been widely deployed (on more than 25,000 aircraft worldwide) and is continuously exposed to a high-tempo, complex air traffic system. TCAS is the product of carefully balancing and integrating sensor characteristics, tracker and aircraft dynamics, maneuver coordination, operational constraints, and human factors in time-critical situations. Missed or late threat detections can lead to collisions, and false alarms may cause pilots to lose trust in the system and ignore alerts, underscoring the need for a robust system design. Building on prior experience, Lincoln Laboratory recently examined potential improvements to the TCAS algorithms and monitored TCAS activity in the Boston area. Now the Laboratory is pursuing new collision avoidance technologies for unmanned aircraft.
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Summary

The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) has had extraordinary success in reducing the risk of mid-air collisions. Now mandated on all large transport aircraft, TCAS has been in operation for more than a decade and has prevented several catastrophic accidents. TCAS is a unique decision support system in...

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Remotely piloted vehicles in civil airspace: requirements and analysis methods for the traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) and see-and-avoid systems

Published in:
Proc. of the 23rd Digital Avionics Systems Conf., DASC, Vol. 2, 24-28 October 2004, pp. 12.D.1-1 - 12.D.1.14.

Summary

The integration of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RF'Vs) into civil airspace will require new methods of ensuring aircraft separation. This paper discusses issues affecting requirements for RPV traffic avoidance systems and for performing the safety evaluations that will be necessary to certify such systems. The paper outlines current ways in which traffic avoidance is assured depending on the type of airspace and type of traffic that is encountered. Alternative methods for RPVs to perform traffic avoidance are discussed, including the potential use of new see-and-avoid sensors or the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Finally, the paper outlines an established safety evaluation process that can be adapted to assure regulatory authorities that RPVs meet level of safety requirements.
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Summary

The integration of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RF'Vs) into civil airspace will require new methods of ensuring aircraft separation. This paper discusses issues affecting requirements for RPV traffic avoidance systems and for performing the safety evaluations that will be necessary to certify such systems. The paper outlines current ways in which...

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Safety analysis process for the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and see-and-avoid systems on remotely piloted vehicles

Published in:
AIAA 3rd Unmanned-Unlimited Technical Conf., 20-23 September 2004, pp. 1-13.

Summary

The integration of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) into civil airspace will require new methods of ensuring traffic avoidance. This paper discusses issues affecting requirements for RPV traffic avoidance systems and describes the safety evaluation process that the international community has deemed necessary to certify such systems. Alternative methods for RPVs to perform traffic avoidance are discussed, including the potential use of new see-and- avoid sensors or the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Concerns that must be addressed to allow the use of TCAS on RPVs are presented. The paper then details the safety evaluation process that is being implemented to evaluate the safety of TCAS on Global Hawk. The same evaluation process can be extended to other RPVs and traffic avoidance systems for which thorough safety analyses will also be required.
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Summary

The integration of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) into civil airspace will require new methods of ensuring traffic avoidance. This paper discusses issues affecting requirements for RPV traffic avoidance systems and describes the safety evaluation process that the international community has deemed necessary to certify such systems. Alternative methods for RPVs...

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Validation techniques for ADS-B surveillance data

Published in:
21st DASC: Proc. of the Digital Avionics Systems Conf., Vol. 1, 27-31 October 2002, pp. 3.E.2-1 - 3.E.2-9.

Summary

Surveillance information forms the basis for providing traffic separation services by Air Traffic Control. The consequences of failures in the integrity and availability of surveillance data have been highlighted in near misses and more tragically, by midair collisions. Recognizing the importance and criticality of surveillance information, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in common with most other Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide has implemented a surveillance architecture that emphasizes the independence of surveillance sources and the availability of crosschecks on all flight critical data. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) changes this approach by combining the navigation and surveillance information into a single system element. ADS-B is a system within which individual aircraft distribute position estimates from onboard navigation equipment via a common communications channel. Any ADS-B receiver may then assemble a complete surveillance picture of nearby aircraft by listening to the common channel and combining the received surveillance reports with an onboard estimate of ownership position. This approach makes use of the increasing sophistication and affordability of navigation equipment (e.g. GPS-based avionics) to improve the accuracy and update rate of surveillance information. However, collapsing the surveillance and navigation systems into a common element increases the vulnerability of the system to erroneous information, both due to intentional and unintentional causes.
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Summary

Surveillance information forms the basis for providing traffic separation services by Air Traffic Control. The consequences of failures in the integrity and availability of surveillance data have been highlighted in near misses and more tragically, by midair collisions. Recognizing the importance and criticality of surveillance information, the U.S. Federal Aviation...

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Lincoln Laboratory Evaluation of TCAS II logic version 6.04a, volume I

Author:
Published in:
Project Report ATC-240,I, MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Summary

This report documents the Lincoln Laboratory evaluation of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) logic version 6.04a. TCAS II is an airborne collision avoidance system required since 30 December 1993 by the FAA on all air carrier aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats operating in U.S. airspace. Version 6.04a is a logic version mandated by the FAA by 30 December 1994 in order to correct a potential safety problem in earlier versions and to make the TCAS logic more compatible with the air traffic control system. Lincoln Laboratory evaluated the logic by examining approximately two million simulated pairwise TCAS-TCAS encounters, derived from actual aircraft tracks recorded in U.S. airspace. The main goals of the evaluation effort were: (1) to determine if version 6.04a successfully corrected the potential safety problem without introducing new problems; (2) to detect and explain any areas of poor performance; and (3) to understand the performance limits of the logic. Five analysis programs were written to aid in the evaluation, and these programs are described in the report. There were three phases of the evaluation corresponding to the above three goals. For each phase, the report gives an overview of the evaluation approach taken, a description of the results, and a summary. A description of follow-on activities plus overall conclusions and recommendations are given at the end of the report.
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Summary

This report documents the Lincoln Laboratory evaluation of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) logic version 6.04a. TCAS II is an airborne collision avoidance system required since 30 December 1993 by the FAA on all air carrier aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats operating in...

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Lincoln Laboratory Evaluation of TCAS II logic version 6.04a, volume I

Author:
Published in:
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report ATC-240,I

Summary

This report documents the Lincoln Laboratory evaluation of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) logic version 6.04a. TCAS II is an airborne collision avoidance system required since 30 December 1993 by the FAA on all air carrier aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats operating in U.S. airspace. Version 6.04a is a logic version mandated by the FAA by 30 December 1994 in order to correct a potential safety problem in earlier versions and to make the TCAS logic more compatible with the air traffic control system. Lincoln Laboratory evaluated the logic by examining approximately two million simulated pairwise TCAS-TCAS encounters, derived from actual aircraft tracks recorded in U.S. airspace. The main goals of the evaluation effort were: (1) to determine if version 6.04a successfully corrected the potential safety problem without introducing new problems; (2) to detect and explain any areas of poor performance; and (3) to understand the performance limits of the logic. Five analysis programs were written to aid in the evaluation, and these programs are described in the report. There were three phases of the evaluation corresponding to the above three goals. For each phase, the report gives an overview of the evaluation approach taken, a description of the results, and a summary. A description of follow-on activities plus overall conclusions and recommendations are given at the end of the report.
READ LESS

Summary

This report documents the Lincoln Laboratory evaluation of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) logic version 6.04a. TCAS II is an airborne collision avoidance system required since 30 December 1993 by the FAA on all air carrier aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats operating in...

READ MORE

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