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Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast in the Gulf of Mexico

Published in:
Lincoln Laboratory Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, December 2008, pp. 55-69.

Summary

The Federal Aviation Administration is adopting Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) to provide surveillance in the National Airspace System (NAS). Aircraft separation services are currently provided by a system of en route and terminal radars, and the performance of these radars in part dictates the separation distance required between aircraft. ADS-B is designed to provide comparable service in areas where no radar coverage exists. It will eventually be the primary surveillance source in the NAS, if it is proven to provide performance equal to or better than radar.
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Summary

The Federal Aviation Administration is adopting Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) to provide surveillance in the National Airspace System (NAS). Aircraft separation services are currently provided by a system of en route and terminal radars, and the performance of these radars in part dictates the separation distance required between aircraft. ADS-B...

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Analysis of ground surveillance assets to support Global Hawk airspace access at Beale Air Force Base

Summary

This study, performed from May 2006 to January 2007 by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, investigated the feasibility of providing ground-sensor-based traffic data directly to Global Hawk operators at Beale AFB. The system concept involves detecting and producing tracks for all cooperative (transponder-equipped) and non-cooperative aircraft from the surface to 18,000 ft MSL, extending from the Beale AFB Class C airspace cylinder northward to the China Military Operations Area (MOA). Data from multiple sensors can be fused together to create a comprehensive air surveillance picture, with the altitudes of non-cooperative targets estimated by fusing returns from all available sensor data. Such a capability, if accepted by the FAA, could mitigate the need for Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR) to satisfy Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) requirements. There are no existing specifications for ground-sensor-based Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) traffic avoidance procedures, nor is it yet known how precisely altitude needs to be estimated. It may be possible to avoid traffic laterally, in which case traffic altitude need not be known accurately. If, however, it is necessary to also avoid traffic vertically, then altitudes will need to be estimated to some (as yet undefined) level of accuracy.
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Summary

This study, performed from May 2006 to January 2007 by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, investigated the feasibility of providing ground-sensor-based traffic data directly to Global Hawk operators at Beale AFB. The system concept involves detecting and producing tracks for all cooperative (transponder-equipped) and non-cooperative aircraft from the surface to 18,000 ft...

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Required surveillance performance accuracy to support 3-mile and 5-mile separation in the National Airspace System

Published in:
Project Report ATC-323, MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Summary

The Federal Aviation Administration is modernizing the Air Traffic Control system to improve flight efficiency, to increase capacity, to reduce flight delays, and to control operating costs as the demand for air travel continues to grow. Promising new surveillance technologies such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast, (ADS-B), multisensor track fusion, and multifunction phased array radar offer the potential for increased efficiency in the National Airspace System (NAS). However, the introduction of these surveillance systems into the NAS is hampered because the FAA Order containing the surveillance requirements to support separation services assumes surveillance is provided by radar technology. The requirements are stated in terms that don't apply to new surveillance technologies. In order to take advantage of new surveillance technologies, the surveillance requirements to support separation services in the NAS must be articulated from a performance perspective that is not technology specific. This will allow the FAA to make the investment and performance trade-off analysis necessary to support the introduction of new surveillance technologies. [not complete]
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Summary

The Federal Aviation Administration is modernizing the Air Traffic Control system to improve flight efficiency, to increase capacity, to reduce flight delays, and to control operating costs as the demand for air travel continues to grow. Promising new surveillance technologies such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast, (ADS-B), multisensor track fusion...

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Required surveillance performance accuracy to support 3-mile and 5-mile separation in the National Airspace System

Published in:
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report ATC-323

Summary

The Federal Aviation Administration is modernizing the Air Traffic Control system to improve flight efficiency, to increase capacity, to reduce flight delays, and to control operating costs as the demand for air travel continues to grow. Promising new surveillance technologies such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast, (ADS-B), multisensor track fusion, and multifunction phased array radar offer the potential for increased efficiency in the National Airspace System (NAS). However, the introduction of these surveillance systems into the NAS is hampered because the FAA Order containing the surveillance requirements to support separation services assumes surveillance is provided by radar technology. The requirements are stated in terms that don't apply to new surveillance technologies. In order to take advantage of new surveillance technologies, the surveillance requirements to support separation services in the NAS must be articulated from a performance perspective that is not technology specific. This will allow the FAA to make the investment and performance trade-off analysis necessary to support the introduction of new surveillance technologies. [not complete]
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Summary

The Federal Aviation Administration is modernizing the Air Traffic Control system to improve flight efficiency, to increase capacity, to reduce flight delays, and to control operating costs as the demand for air travel continues to grow. Promising new surveillance technologies such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast, (ADS-B), multisensor track fusion...

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Surveillance accuracy requirements in support of separation services

Published in:
Lincoln Laboratory Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1, June 2006, pp. 97-122.

Summary

The Federal Aviation Administration is modernizing the Air Traffic Control system to improve flight efficiency, to increase airspace capacity, to reduce flight delays, and to control operating costs as the demand for air travel continues to grow. Promising new surveillance technologies such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast and multisensor track fusion offer the potential to augment the ground-based surveillance and controller-display systems by providing more timely and complete information about aircraft. The resulting improvement in surveillance accuracy may potentially allow the expanded use of the minimum safe-separation distance between aircraft. However, these new technologies cannot be introduced with today's radar-separation standards, because they assume surveillance will be provided only through radar technology. In this article, we review the background of aircraft surveillance and the establishment of radar separation standards. The required surveillance accuracy to safely support aircraft separation with National Airspace System technologies is then derived from currently widely used surveillance systems. We end with flight test validation of the derived results, which can be used to evaluate new technologies.
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Summary

The Federal Aviation Administration is modernizing the Air Traffic Control system to improve flight efficiency, to increase airspace capacity, to reduce flight delays, and to control operating costs as the demand for air travel continues to grow. Promising new surveillance technologies such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast and multisensor track...

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Remotely piloted vehicles in civil airspace: requirements and analysis methods for the traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) and see-and-avoid systems

Published in:
Proc. of the 23rd Digital Avionics Systems Conf., DASC, Vol. 2, 24-28 October 2004, pp. 12.D.1-1 - 12.D.1.14.

Summary

The integration of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RF'Vs) into civil airspace will require new methods of ensuring aircraft separation. This paper discusses issues affecting requirements for RPV traffic avoidance systems and for performing the safety evaluations that will be necessary to certify such systems. The paper outlines current ways in which traffic avoidance is assured depending on the type of airspace and type of traffic that is encountered. Alternative methods for RPVs to perform traffic avoidance are discussed, including the potential use of new see-and-avoid sensors or the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Finally, the paper outlines an established safety evaluation process that can be adapted to assure regulatory authorities that RPVs meet level of safety requirements.
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Summary

The integration of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RF'Vs) into civil airspace will require new methods of ensuring aircraft separation. This paper discusses issues affecting requirements for RPV traffic avoidance systems and for performing the safety evaluations that will be necessary to certify such systems. The paper outlines current ways in which...

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Safety analysis process for the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and see-and-avoid systems on remotely piloted vehicles

Published in:
AIAA 3rd Unmanned-Unlimited Technical Conf., 20-23 September 2004, pp. 1-13.

Summary

The integration of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) into civil airspace will require new methods of ensuring traffic avoidance. This paper discusses issues affecting requirements for RPV traffic avoidance systems and describes the safety evaluation process that the international community has deemed necessary to certify such systems. Alternative methods for RPVs to perform traffic avoidance are discussed, including the potential use of new see-and- avoid sensors or the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Concerns that must be addressed to allow the use of TCAS on RPVs are presented. The paper then details the safety evaluation process that is being implemented to evaluate the safety of TCAS on Global Hawk. The same evaluation process can be extended to other RPVs and traffic avoidance systems for which thorough safety analyses will also be required.
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Summary

The integration of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) into civil airspace will require new methods of ensuring traffic avoidance. This paper discusses issues affecting requirements for RPV traffic avoidance systems and describes the safety evaluation process that the international community has deemed necessary to certify such systems. Alternative methods for RPVs...

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Analysis and comparison of separation measurement errors in single sensor and multiple radar mosaic display terminal environments

Published in:
Project Report ATC-306, MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Topic:

Summary

This paper presents an analysis to estimate and characterize the errors in the measured separation distance between aircraft that are displayed on a radar screen to a controller in a single sensor terminal environment compared to a multiple radar mosaic terminal environment. The error in measured or displayed separation is the difference between the true separation or distance between aircraft in the air and the separation displayed to a controller on a radar screen. In order to eliminate as many variables as possible and to concentrate specifically on the differences between displayed separation errors in the two environments, for the purposes of this analysis, only full operation Mode S secondary beacon surveillance characteristics are considered. A summary of the Mode S secondary radar error sources and characteristics used to model the resultant errors in measured separation between aircraft in single and multi-radar terminal environments is presented. The analysis for average separation errors show that the performance of radars in providing separation services degrades with range. The analysis also shows that when using independent radars in a mosaic display, separation errors will increase, on average, compared to the performance when providing separation with a single radar. The data presented in the section on average separation errors is summarized by plotting the standard deviation of the separation error as a function of range for the single radar case and for the independent mosaic display case. The sections on typical and specific errors in separation measurements illustrate that the separation measurement errors are highly dependent on the geometry of the aircraft and radars. Applying average results to specific geometries can lead to counter intuitive results is illustrated in an example case presented in analysis.
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Summary

This paper presents an analysis to estimate and characterize the errors in the measured separation distance between aircraft that are displayed on a radar screen to a controller in a single sensor terminal environment compared to a multiple radar mosaic terminal environment. The error in measured or displayed separation is...

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Analysis and comparison of separation measurement errors in single sensor and multiple radar mosiac display terminal environments

Published in:
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report ATC-306
Topic:

Summary

This paper presents an analyis to estimate and characterize the errors in the measured separation distance between aircraft that are displayed on a radar screen to a controller in a single sensor terminal environment compared to a multiple radar mosiac terminal environment. The error in measured or displayed separation is the difference between the true separation or distance between aircraft in the air and the separation displayed to a controller on a radar screen. In order to eliminate as many variables as possible and to concentrate specifically on the differences between displayed separation errors in the two environments, for the purposes of this analysis, only full operation Mode S secondary beacon surveillance characteristics are considered. A summary of the Mode S secondary radar error sources and characteristics used to model the resultant errors in measured separation between aircraft in single and multi-radar terminal environments is presented. The analysis for average separation errors show that the performance of radars in providing separation services degrades with range. The analysis also shows that when using independent radars in a mosiac display, separation errors will increase, on average, compared to the performance when providing separation with a single radar. The data presented in the section on average separation errors is summarized by plotting the standard deviation of the separation error as a function of range for the single radar case and for the independent mosiac display case. The sections on typical and specific errors in separation measurements illustrate that the separation measurement errors are highly dependent on the geometry of the aircraft and radars. Applying average results to specific geometries can lead to counter intuitive results is illustrated in an example case presented in analysis.
READ LESS

Summary

This paper presents an analyis to estimate and characterize the errors in the measured separation distance between aircraft that are displayed on a radar screen to a controller in a single sensor terminal environment compared to a multiple radar mosiac terminal environment. The error in measured or displayed separation is...

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Surveillance performance requirements for runway incursion prevention systems

Published in:
Project Report ATC-301, MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Summary

In response to concerns over the number of runway incursions and runway conflicts at U.S. airports, the FAA is sponsoring research and development of safety systems for the airport surface. Two types of safety systems are being actively pursued, a tower cab alerting system and a runway status light system. The tower cab alerting system, called the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) is currently undergoing initial operational evaluation at several major airports. It provides aural and visual alerts to the tower cab to warn the controllers of potential traffic conflicts. The runway status light system is currently in the development phase, with initial operational suitability demonstrations planned at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport during FY2003. Intended to offer protection in time-critical conflict scenarios where there is not enough time to warn the aircrews indirectly via the tower cab, the runway status light system provides visual indication of runway status directly to the cockpit; runway entrance lights warn pilots not to enter a runway on which there is approaching high-speed traffic; takeoff-hold lights warn pilots not to start takeoff if a conflict could occur. Both systems operate automatically, requiring no controller inputs. Activation commands for alerts and lights are generated by the systems' safety logic, which in turn receives airport traffic inputs from a surface surveillance and target tracking system. Accurate traffic representation is essential to meet system requirements, which include high conflict detection rate, prompt and accurate alerting and light activation, low nuisance and false alarm rates, and negligible interference with normal operations. This report analyzes the effect of the two fundamental surveillance performance parameters-position accuracy and surveillance update rate - on the performance of three different surface safety systems. The first two are the above-mentioned tower cab alerting and runway status light systems. The third system is a hypothetical cockpit alerting system that delivers alerts directly to the cockpit rather than to the tower cab. The surveillance accuracy and update rate requirements of these three systems are analyzed for three of the most common runway conflict scenarios, using realistic parameter values for aircraft motion. The scenarios are 1) a runway incursion by a taxiing aircraft in front of a departure or arrival, 2) a departure on an occupied runway, and 3) an arrival on an occupied runway. Runway status lights are especially effective at preventing incursions and accidents between takeoff or arrival aircraft and intersection taxi aircraft. Tower cab alerts are effective at alerting controllers to aircraft crossing or on a runway during an arrival. Runway status information provided directly to the cockpit will be required for the case where a previous arrival or a taxi aircraft fails to exit the runway as anticipated shortly before the arrival crossed the threshold. (not complete)
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Summary

In response to concerns over the number of runway incursions and runway conflicts at U.S. airports, the FAA is sponsoring research and development of safety systems for the airport surface. Two types of safety systems are being actively pursued, a tower cab alerting system and a runway status light system...

READ MORE