Publications
Learning from incidents - what the machine can learn
October 2, 2000
Conference Paper
Published in:
Int. Society of Air Safety Investigators Conf., ISASI, 2-6 October 2000.
Summary
Aviation weather refers to any type of weather that can affect the operation of an aircraft – anything from a brief delay in departure to a catastrophic accident during flight. Wind shear and events associated with convective weather were recognized as an aviation hazard long before Dr. Theodore Fujita began publishing his now-famous treatises. On July 28, 1943, American Airlines Flight 63 from Cleveland, Ohio, USA to Nashville, Tennessee crashed after the pilot lost control of the Douglas DC3. The pilots and numerous passengers were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and post crash fire. The weather report at the time included warnings for storms, heavy rain, lightning and severe turbulence. The Civil Aeronautics Board found that the probable cause was a loss of control of the aircraft due to unusually severe turbulence and violent downdraft caused by a thunderstorm. In the ten-year period from 1987 through 1996, 24% of all U.S. accidents were judged to be "weather related". For the twenty-year period 1976 to 1996 fully 43% of U.S. accidents were judged to have involved wind or wind shear, and 2.3 % thunderstorm, although the two data elements are not mutually exclusive. In the U.S., approximately 82% of accidents are general aviation; the rest are air carriers and commuters of various types. When general aviation accidents are negated, and only air carriers are considered, wind and wind shear issues account for 9.5% of accidents. The Weather Systems Processor (WSP) has been developed to reduce the impact of severe weather conditions on air traffic by providing information concerning weather conditions in the airport terminal environment. WSP provides warnings to air traffic controllers and supervisors of hazardous wind shear and microburst events in the terminal area, forecasts the arrival of gust fronts, and tracks thunderstorms, providing a complete picture of current and future terminal area hazardous weather conditions that may impact runway and airport usage. Common weather situation awareness allows Terminal Approach, Tower Controllers and other traffic management personnel to jointly plan with confidence and safely manage more arrivals and departures with less delay. Knowledge of the location, severity and movement of hazardous weather allows dynamic adjustments to be made in routing aircraft to runways, approach and departure corridors, terminal arrival and departure transition areas (i.e. gate-posts) and other air routes.
Summary
Aviation weather refers to any type of weather that can affect the operation of an aircraft – anything from a brief delay in departure to a catastrophic accident during flight. Wind shear and events associated with convective weather were recognized as an aviation hazard long before Dr. Theodore Fujita began...
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Analysis and results of the 1999 DARPA off-line intrusion detection evaluation
October 2, 2000
Conference Paper
Published in:
Proc. Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, RAID, 2-4 October 2000, pp. 162-182.
R&D area:
R&D group:
Summary
Eight sites participated in the second DARPA off-line intrusion detection evaluation in 1999. Three weeks of training and two weeks of test data were generated on a test bed that emulates a small government site. More than 200 instances of 58 attack types were launched against victim UNIX and Windows NT hosts. False alarm rates were low (less than 10 per day). Best detection was provided by network-based systems for old probe and old denial-of-service (DOS) attacks and by host-based systems for Solaris user-to-root (U2R) attacks. Best over-all performance would have been provided by a combined system that used both host- and network-based intrusion detection. Detection accuracy was poor for previously unseen new, stealthy, and Windows NT attacks. Ten of the 58 attack types were completely missed by all systems. Systems missed attacks because protocols and TCP services were not analyzed at all or to the depth required, because signatures for old attacks did not generalize to new attacks, and because auditing was not available on all hosts.
Summary
Eight sites participated in the second DARPA off-line intrusion detection evaluation in 1999. Three weeks of training and two weeks of test data were generated on a test bed that emulates a small government site. More than 200 instances of 58 attack types were launched against victim UNIX and Windows...
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The 1999 DARPA Off-Line Intrusion Detection Evaluation
October 1, 2000
Journal Article
Published in:
Comput. Networks, Vol. 34, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 579-595.
R&D area:
R&D group:
Summary
Eight sites participated in the second Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) off-line intrusion detection evaluation in 1999. A test bed generated live background traffic similar to that on a government site containing hundreds of users on thousands of hosts. More than 200 instances of 58 attack types were launched against victim UNIX and Windows NT hosts in three weeks of training data and two weeks of test data. False-alarm rates were low (less than 10 per day). The best detection was provided by network-based systems for old probe and old denial-of-service (DOS) attacks and by host-based systems for Solaris user-to-root (U2R) attacks. The best overall performance would have been provided by a combined system that used both host- and network-based intrusion detection. Detection accuracy was poor for previously unseen, new, stealthy and Windows NT attacks. Ten of the 58 attack types were completely missed by all systems. Systems missed attacks because signatures for old attacks did not generalize to new attacks, auditing was not available on all hosts, and protocols and TCP services were not analyzed at all or to the depth required. Promising capabilities were demonstrated by host-based systems, anomaly detection systems and a system that performs forensic analysis on file system data.
Summary
Eight sites participated in the second Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) off-line intrusion detection evaluation in 1999. A test bed generated live background traffic similar to that on a government site containing hundreds of users on thousands of hosts. More than 200 instances of 58 attack types were launched...
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Combining-efficiency X-band spatial power-combined array using a multilayered packaging architecture
October 1, 2000
Journal Article
Published in:
IEEE Trans. Microw. Theory Tech., Vol. 48, No. 10, October 2000, pp. 1769-1771.
Topic:
Summary
The design of a high combining-efficiency spatial power-combined array is described in this paper. A multilayered stacked stripline architecture enables a compact stable design. An array incorporating antenna active impedance and proper amplifier matching is measured with a combining efficiency of 87%, radiating 6.8 W of an available 7.8 W into the ideal uniformly illuminated array directivity at 10.1 GHz.
Summary
The design of a high combining-efficiency spatial power-combined array is described in this paper. A multilayered stacked stripline architecture enables a compact stable design. An array incorporating antenna active impedance and proper amplifier matching is measured with a combining efficiency of 87%, radiating 6.8 W of an available 7.8 W...
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A meteorological analysis of the American Airlines Flight 1420 accident
September 11, 2000
Conference Paper
Published in:
Ninth Conf. on Aviation, Range, and Aerospace Meteorology, 11-15 September 2000, pp. 209-211.
Summary
On June 1, 1999, American Airlines flight 1420 , arriving at Little Rock, AR from Dallas-Fort Worth, TX, was involved in a fatal accident upon landing, on runway 4R at Adams Field (LIT). There were eleven casualties, including the pilot, and numerous injuries among the 145 passengers and crew on board. At the time of the accident, 0451 UTC (11:51 PM CDT), severe thunderstorms existed in the vicinity of the airport. These storms were initiated by an approaching cold front and pre-frontal trough and were developmentally aided by veering low-level wind and warm air advection, which helped to further destabilize the atmosphere. This report will focus on the meteorological conditions preceding and immediately following the accident that could have played a contributing role in the crash. However, no theories on the actual cause will be put forth.
Summary
On June 1, 1999, American Airlines flight 1420 , arriving at Little Rock, AR from Dallas-Fort Worth, TX, was involved in a fatal accident upon landing, on runway 4R at Adams Field (LIT). There were eleven casualties, including the pilot, and numerous injuries among the 145 passengers and crew on...
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A study of time-to-fly estimates for RUC and ITWS winds
September 11, 2000
Conference Paper
Published in:
Proc. Ninth Conf. on Aviation Range and Aerospace Meteorology, 11-15 September 2000, pp. 113-117.
Summary
Automated air traffic decision support tools must compute the time it takes an aircraft to fly along a path. The estimation of Time-To-Fly (TTF) requires accurate knowledge of the wind. Two proposed sources of wind data for the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) developed by NASA are the Rapid Update Cycle (RUC) and the Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS). The RUC is a mesoscale numerical weather prediction model run by the National Centers for Environmental Prediction. The ITWS was developed by MIT Lincoln Laboratory for the FAA. The ITWS winds product, Terminal Winds takes in RUC forecasts and refines them using recent local measurements of the wind from Doppler radars, aircraft, and ground stations. This report examines the question: does the use of RUC and ITWS wind fields lead to different Time-To-Fly estimates?
Summary
Automated air traffic decision support tools must compute the time it takes an aircraft to fly along a path. The estimation of Time-To-Fly (TTF) requires accurate knowledge of the wind. Two proposed sources of wind data for the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) developed by NASA are the Rapid Update Cycle...
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Airline operations center usage of FAA terminal weather information products
September 11, 2000
Conference Paper
Published in:
Ninth Conf. on Aviation, Range, and Aerospace Meteorology, 11-15 September 2000, pp. 76-81.
Summary
Adverse terminal weather is a key factor in the safety and efficiency of airline operations. Weather has been directly related to many of the air carrier accidents with fatalities in the 1990's, and the cost to airlines per year for weather delays is estimated to exceed one billion dollars, with at least half of this arising from convective weather. This paper discusses the airline operations center (AOC) use of information from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) terminal weather systems to improve safety and operational efficiency (e.g., reduce delays and diversions, improve predictability, and airline schedule integrity) during severe or rapidly changing conditions. Historically (e.g., prior to 1992), the FAA terminal weather information capability was fairly rudimentary, and airlines had no access to the information. However, with deployment of the ITWS, the ASR-9 Weather Systems Processor (WSP) production systems, and CDMnet (and perhaps Internet) product servers for ITWS and WSP airlines will have access to the products. Thus, it is important now to consider how these products could be used operationally and what refinements should be made to the ITWS/WSP products to better meet the needs of airline users.
Summary
Adverse terminal weather is a key factor in the safety and efficiency of airline operations. Weather has been directly related to many of the air carrier accidents with fatalities in the 1990's, and the cost to airlines per year for weather delays is estimated to exceed one billion dollars, with...
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Distribution of aviation weather hazard information: low altitude wind shear
September 11, 2000
Conference Paper
Published in:
Ninth Conf. on Aviation, Range, and Aerospace Meteorology, 11-15 September 2000, pp. 499-504.
Topic:
R&D area:
Summary
Weather Hazard Information distribution is a necessary component for a successful system of weather hazard avoidance for aviation. It is a very important component, but not the only one. In order to be successful, a complete set of components must be included in the system: 1) Accurate Conceptual Model (Appropriate models of the physical process responsible for generating the hazard); 2) Production Infrastructure (System of tools [hardware, software and manpower]; the raw data feeds necessary for production of the hazard information and a standardized message format); 3) Quality Control Infrastructure (System of tools [hardware, software and manpower] & data feeds necessary for identifying and correcting erroneous information immediately); 4) Distribution Infrastructure (A method to relay, in a timely manner, only the information pertinent to the specific user); 5) Policies and Procedures (There must be clearly defined expectations of actions required of the users and recipients of the hazard information); 5) Training (The users and recipients as well as individuals responsible for production and quality control of the information must receive initial and recurrent training regarding actions required). ICAO in their Annex 3, Chapter 7 titled, SIGMET Information, Aerodrome Warnings and Wind Shear Warnings [ICAO 19981, describes in part one such system for weather hazard avoidance. ICAO does a good job defining the necessary production infrastructure. ICAO especially has been successful in defining the standardized message format. The format for SlGMETs is described in detail in Annex 3. But, an international organization Such as ICAO is limited in its scope of influence. Quality control of the SIGMET product and the distribution of the SIGMET is, in large part, beyond ICAO’s control. In addition, the actual weather hazard avoidance policies, procedures and training must be accomplished internally by each individual commercial aviation operator. Since each component listed above is directly dependent on the other five for a successful weather hazard avoidance system, Northwest Airlines (NWA) has chosen to attempt to address all six components of the system internally with use of the NWA Turbulence Plot System (TPS) [Fahey et. al. 2000].
Summary
Weather Hazard Information distribution is a necessary component for a successful system of weather hazard avoidance for aviation. It is a very important component, but not the only one. In order to be successful, a complete set of components must be included in the system: 1) Accurate Conceptual Model (Appropriate...
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FAA surveillance radar data as a complement to the WSR-88D network
September 11, 2000
Conference Paper
Published in:
Proc. Ninth Conf. on Aviation, Range, and Aerospace Meteorology and 20th Conf. on Severe Local Storms, 11-15 September 2000, pp. J35-J39.
Summary
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates over 400 C- to L-band surveillance radars-Airport Surveillance Radars (ASRs), Air Route Surveillance Radars (ARSRs) and Terminal Doppler Weather Radars (TDWRs). Current generation terminal and en route aircraft surveillance radars (ASR-9, ASR-11 and ARSR-4) feature dedicated digital processing channels that measure and display precipitation reflectivity. Some of these "weather channels" will be upgraded to measure Doppler velocity, supporting, for example, wind shear detection at air terminals. The Terminal Doppler Weather Radar is a high quality dedicated meteorological surveillance radar deployed near many of the larger airports in the U.S. In this paper we consider how these radars could complement the WSR-88D network in providing a variety of meteorological services to the U.S. public. Potential benefits from a combined radar network would accrue from significantly increased radar density and the more rapid temporal updates of the FAA radars. Convective weather monitoring and forecasting, hydrological measurements and services to aviation are examples of areas where significant improvements could be expected. Section 2 reviews the status of the FAA radars their parameters, locations and capabilities. We also note the progress of various upgrade programs that will increase their weather surveillance capabilities substantially. In Section 3, we discuss benefits that would result from their usage in conjunction with the WSR-88D network. Finally, we discuss technological developments that will facilitate realization of these benefits.
Summary
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates over 400 C- to L-band surveillance radars-Airport Surveillance Radars (ASRs), Air Route Surveillance Radars (ARSRs) and Terminal Doppler Weather Radars (TDWRs). Current generation terminal and en route aircraft surveillance radars (ASR-9, ASR-11 and ARSR-4) feature dedicated digital processing channels that measure and display...
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Extending the Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) to address urgent terminal area weather needs
September 11, 2000
Conference Paper
Published in:
Ninth Conf. on Aviation, Range, and Aerospace Meteorology, 11-15 September 2000, pp. 153-158.
Summary
Major terminals and the surrounding en route airspace are critical elements of the US National Air System (NAS). A large fraction of the US population lives near these terminals, and the bulk of the hub connecting operations are at these airports as well. Adverse weather in these terminal areas and surrounding en route airspace is a major safety concern for the NAS as well as causing a large fraction of all US aviation delays. The principal weather decision support tool for these terminals is the Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) which commenced full-scale development by the FAA in 1995, with first articles to be deployed shortly. In this paper, we discuss how the initial ITWS operational capability needs to be extended to address performance problems identified in operational use and to meet the many new user needs that have developed in the past five years. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide some necessary background on the ITWS operational capability, followed by a discussion of new capabilities to meet urgent user needs. Section 3 discusses refinements to the initial capability to address problems/issues that have been identified based on five years of operational use of ITWS products from ITWS demonstration systems at eight major airports. Next, we consider extending planned ITWS coverage to other major terminals. The final section summarizes the paper's results and suggests additional studies.
Summary
Major terminals and the surrounding en route airspace are critical elements of the US National Air System (NAS). A large fraction of the US population lives near these terminals, and the bulk of the hub connecting operations are at these airports as well. Adverse weather in these terminal areas and...
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