Publications

Aviation weather refers to any type of weather that can affect the operation of an aircraft – anything from a brief delay in departure to a catastrophic accident during flight. Wind shear and events associated with convective weather were recognized as an aviation hazard long before Dr. Theodore Fujita began publishing his now-famous treatises. On July 28, 1943, American Airlines Flight 63 from Cleveland, Ohio, USA to Nashville, Tennessee crashed after the pilot lost control of the Douglas DC3. The pilots and numerous passengers were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and post crash fire. The weather report at the time included warnings for storms, heavy rain, lightning and severe turbulence. The Civil Aeronautics Board found that the probable cause was a loss of control of the aircraft due to unusually severe turbulence and violent downdraft caused by a thunderstorm. In the ten-year period from 1987 through 1996, 24% of all U.S. accidents were judged to be "weather related". For the twenty-year period 1976 to 1996 fully 43% of U.S. accidents were judged to have involved wind or wind shear, and 2.3 % thunderstorm, although the two data elements are not mutually exclusive. In the U.S., approximately 82% of accidents are general aviation; the rest are air carriers and commuters of various types. When general aviation accidents are negated, and only air carriers are considered, wind and wind shear issues account for 9.5% of accidents. The Weather Systems Processor (WSP) has been developed to reduce the impact of severe weather conditions on air traffic by providing information concerning weather conditions in the airport terminal environment. WSP provides warnings to air traffic controllers and supervisors of hazardous wind shear and microburst events in the terminal area, forecasts the arrival of gust fronts, and tracks thunderstorms, providing a complete picture of current and future terminal area hazardous weather conditions that may impact runway and airport usage. Common weather situation awareness allows Terminal Approach, Tower Controllers and other traffic management personnel to jointly plan with confidence and safely manage more arrivals and departures with less delay. Knowledge of the location, severity and movement of hazardous weather allows dynamic adjustments to be made in routing aircraft to runways, approach and departure corridors, terminal arrival and departure transition areas (i.e. gate-posts) and other air routes.

Eight sites participated in the second DARPA off-line intrusion detection evaluation in 1999. Three weeks of training and two weeks of test data were generated on a test bed that emulates a small government site. More than 200 instances of 58 attack types were launched against victim UNIX and Windows NT hosts. False alarm rates were low (less than 10 per day). Best detection was provided by network-based systems for old probe and old denial-of-service (DOS) attacks and by host-based systems for Solaris user-to-root (U2R) attacks. Best over-all performance would have been provided by a combined system that used both host- and network-based intrusion detection. Detection accuracy was poor for previously unseen new, stealthy, and Windows NT attacks. Ten of the 58 attack types were completely missed by all systems. Systems missed attacks because protocols and TCP services were not analyzed at all or to the depth required, because signatures for old attacks did not generalize to new attacks, and because auditing was not available on all hosts.

Eight sites participated in the second Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) off-line intrusion detection evaluation in 1999. A test bed generated live background traffic similar to that on a government site containing hundreds of users on thousands of hosts. More than 200 instances of 58 attack types were launched against victim UNIX and Windows NT hosts in three weeks of training data and two weeks of test data. False-alarm rates were low (less than 10 per day). The best detection was provided by network-based systems for old probe and old denial-of-service (DOS) attacks and by host-based systems for Solaris user-to-root (U2R) attacks. The best overall performance would have been provided by a combined system that used both host- and network-based intrusion detection. Detection accuracy was poor for previously unseen, new, stealthy and Windows NT attacks. Ten of the 58 attack types were completely missed by all systems. Systems missed attacks because signatures for old attacks did not generalize to new attacks, auditing was not available on all hosts, and protocols and TCP services were not analyzed at all or to the depth required. Promising capabilities were demonstrated by host-based systems, anomaly detection systems and a system that performs forensic analysis on file system data.

The design of a high combining-efficiency spatial power-combined array is described in this paper. A multilayered stacked stripline architecture enables a compact stable design. An array incorporating antenna active impedance and proper amplifier matching is measured with a combining efficiency of 87%, radiating 6.8 W of an available 7.8 W into the ideal uniformly illuminated array directivity at 10.1 GHz.

Thunderstorms are dynamic obstacles to the flow of air traffic. Aircraft routing in the presence of thunderstorms is as dynamic as the position and intensity of the storms. The question of where pilots will and will not fly is relevant to the decisions made by human air traffic managers as well as to the development of automated decision aid tools. In order to accurately anticipate which routes will be useable one needs to be able to 1) forecast the relevant weather variables, and 2) convert those weather variables into a quantitative probability that pilots will request deviations from the nominal route. The Convective Weather Integrated Product Team at the FAA is improving the accuracy and lead time of forecasts of thunderstorm products. This paper provides an update on our examination of the issue of probability of deviation. In our recent examination of 63 hours of weather and flight track data from the DFW airspace (Rhoda and Pawlak, 1999a,b) we combined several weather variables (measurements, not forecasts) to correctly predict pilot deviation and penetration behavior for 70-85% of the encounters between thunderstorms and aircraft arriving at DW and Dallas Love (DAL) airports. We also found that pilots were more likely to penetrate strong precipitation when they: 1) were near the arrival airport, 2) were following another aircraft, 3) were flying after dark, 4) had been delayed in the air by 15+ minutes upstream of the DFW airspace. We did not find any statistically significant difference between the percentages of thunderstorm penetrations by various airlines. We also found that persistent penetration of storms near the airport is sometimes abruptly interrupted presumably by wind shear alerts from air traffic controllers or cautionary pilot reports from the penetrating aircraft. When the arrivals cease, aircraft on the final approach course may turn suddenly to the left or right to avoid the weather that caused the interruption. Aircraft that abort the approach sometimes fly through very intense precipitation-sometimes through downdrafts that are causing microburst outflows at the surface. The work described in this paper applies the methodology from the DFW study to data collected in the Memphis Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). The methodology is described briefly here and in more detail in (Rhoda and Pawlak, 1999b). We developed several probability of deviation classifiers using a portion of the Memphis data and tested them on the remaining data to determine if it is possible to predict whether pilots will penetrate or deviate around the storms. We also tested the classifiers that were developed in the DNV study on the MEM data and vice versa. We repeated the DFW hypothesis tests for various dichotomies of encounters: near/far, leading/following, light/dark, delayed/undelayed.

Gust front detection is an important Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS). The Machine Intelligent Gust Front Algorithm (MIGFA) being deployed for ITWS uses multi-dimensional, knowledge-based signal processing techniques to detect and track gust fronts in Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) data. Versions of MIGFA have also been developed for the ASR-9 Weather Systems Processor (WSP) and NEXRAD, and within the past year MIGFA was installed as the primary gust front detection algorithm for operational TDWRs throughout the United States. (Not complete.)

On December 6th, 1998, a fatal accident involving a twin engine Beech Baron occurred near the Max-Westheimer Airport at Norman Oklahoma (OUN). Although the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted an extensive investigation into this accident, the probable cause for the accident has yet to be determined. Since the accident occurred outside of weather echoes that might be considered hazardous, it seems difficult to deduce a meteorological explanation for this accident. However, Doppler radar data suggested the presence of wave formations near the site of the accident. This report reflects examination of the data provided by the NTSB.

Air traffic delay due to convective weather reached historically high levels in 1999, as passengers blamed airlines and airlines blamed the FAA for the massive inconveniences. While coordination between the FAA's System Command Center and the regional centers and terminals can be expected to improve with the FAA's new initiatives, it is clear that air traffic management and planning during convective weather will ultimately require accurate convective weather forecasts. In addition to improving system capacity and reducing delay, convective forecasts can help provide safer flight routes as well. The crash of a commercial airliner at Little Rock, AR in June 1999 after a one-hour flight from Dallas/Ft. Worth illustrates the dangers and potential tactical advantage that could be gained with frequently updated one-hour forecasts of convective storms. The Terminal Convective Weather Forecast (TCWF) product has been developed by MIT Lincoln Laboratory as part of the FAA Aviation Weather' Research Convective Weather Product Development Team (PDT). Lincoln began by consulting with air traffic personnel and commercial airline dispatchers to determine the needs of aviation users (Forman, et. al., 1999). Users indicated that convective weather, particularly line storms, caused the most consistent problems for managing air traffic. The "Growth and Decay Storm Tracker" developed by Wolfson et al. (1999) allows the generation of up to 1-hour forecasts of large scale, organized precipitation features with operationally useful accuracy. This patented technology. represents a breakthrough in short-term forecasting capability, providing quantitative envelope tracking as opposed to the usual cell tracking. This tracking technology is now being utilized in NCAR's AutoNowcaster (Mueller, et al., 2000), the National Convective Weather Forecast running at the Aviation Weather Center (Megenhardt, et al., 2000) and by private sector meteorological data vendors. The TCWF has been tested in Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) since 1998, in Orlando (MCO) since 1999, and in New York (NYC) since fiscal year 2000 began. These have been informal demonstrations, with the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center (WJHTC) assessing utility to the users, and with MIT LL modifying the system based on user feedback and performance analyses. TCWF has undergone major revisions, and the latest build has now been deployed at all sites. The TCWF is now in a formal assessment phase at the Memphis international Airport as a prerequisite to an FAA operational requirement. The FAA Technical Center will make a recommendation on whether TCWF is suitable for inclusion in the FAA's operational integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS), which has an unmet requirement for 30+ minute forecasts of convective weather. Memphis was selected for the TCWF Assessment since it has not been exposed to the forecast product during prior demonstrations. Operations began on March 24, 2000 and operational feedback is being assessed by the FAA Technical Center (McGettigan, et al., 2000) and MCR Corporation is performing a quantitative benefits assessment (Sunderlin and Paull, 2000). This paper details the refined TCWF algorithm and display concept, gives examples of the operational impact of terminal forecasts, and analyzes the technical performance of the TCWF during the early stages of the Memphis Assessment.

The Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) provides runway-orientated wind shear and microburst alerts to enhance the safety of flight operations at major U.S. airports. The alerts are reported as either losses or gains of airspeed, representing performance decreasing or performance increasing wind shears. The performance of ITWS as a stand-alone system has been thoroughly documented in previous research. During the 1994 ITWS Demonstration and Validation testing, the probability of detection (POD) and probability of false alarm (PFA) at Memphis (MEM) and Orlando (MCO) for all loss events were > 90 and < 5 percent, respectively, based on single-Doppler truth. The Low-Level Windshear Alert System-Network Expansion (LLWAS-NE) also generates runway alerts in the same format as ITWS. LLWAS-NE is not subject to viewing angle problems such as those experienced by single-Doppler radar. However, false alarms caused by LLWAS-NE sensor failures at some Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) sites have reduced user confidence in the system. At those ITWS sites with an LLWAS-NE, the ITWS alerts derived from TDWR data will be integrated with LLWAS-NE alerts, hopefully to improve the performance. The ITWS integration algorithm is identical to the TDWR version, with the exception of a few adaptable parameter changes. The ITWS/LLWAS-NE parameters were modified slightly to account for ITWS and TDWR algorithm performance differences. In this paper, the performance of a stand-alone ITWS and the ITWS/LLWAS-NE integration algorithm at the MCO and Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) demonstration sites will be discussed. This assessment is considered unique since the radar and anemometer data were combined to create the runway truth. The focus of this research is to identify the shortcomings of both systems in order to recommend modifications that will improve the integration algorithm performance.

Operational experience with the Integrated Terminal Weather Systems (ITWS) and Airport Surveillance Radar, Model 9, (ASR-9) Weather System Processor (WSP) demonstration systems, studies of pilot weather avoidance decision making), and recent accidents have demonstrated the need to provide timely, accurate information on the location and movement of storms to air traffic controllers, pilots, and airline dispatch. At medium-intensity airports, generally those with too few flight operations to justify the presence of Doppler radar systems like the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) or the WSP, terminal air traffic surveillance is currently provided with the ASR-7 and ASR-8 radar systems. The ASR-7 and ASR-8 do not provide calibrated precipitation intensity products or any storm motion information. The Medium-Intensity Airport Weather System (MIAWS) program is intended to address these terminal weather information deficiencies. MIAWS-generated products would be displayed to tower and Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) supervisors and delivered to aircraft cockpits and airline dispatchers to assist pilots during landings. Initially, the MIAWS will provide a real time display of storm positions and motion based on Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) product data using a product generation and display system derived from the WSP. Airport wind and wind shear information will be acquired from an FAA Low Level Wind Shear Alert System (LLWAS). A demonstration system will be installed and demonstrated at experimental sites in Memphis, TN and Jackson, MS in 2000 and potentially at a third site in 2001. This demonstration system will be used to assess technical and operational issues such as compensation for the relatively slow updates of the NEXRAD products and, Anomalous Propagation (AP) ground clutter. The ASR-11 is a replacement for the ASR-7/8 radars that feature a weather reflectivity processing channel. When it becomes available at MIAWS locations, the MIAWS processor will acquire and display precipitation and storm movement products derived from the ASR-11. Likewise, when an LLWAS Relocation/Sustainment (LLWAS-RS) (Nilsen, et al., 1999) becomes available at MIAWS locations, the MIAWS will acquire wind and wind shear information derived from the LLWAS-RS.